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1989, p. 3534). And the debate continues today
as the Clinton Administration attempts to restore democracy in Haiti. Interestingly, however, this readiness to use force in the name of democracy does not appear to square with some of the emerging findings on the pacific relations among democratic nations. If states do not war on each other because they are democratic, does it make sense that they wage war or use force to compel others to become democratic? Is democracy both a reason for peace and a justification for war? In this article I hope to answer two central questions related to the use of force by the United States in the ostensible quest to promote democracy. First, why would the United States intervene in the affairs of other nations to promote democracy? And second is the use of force an effective tool in the promotion of democracy?
To accomplish these goals, I examine literature on the relationship between regime type and conflict, the viability of promoting democracy in US foreign policy, and military interventions. Second, using data on US military interventions and the democratic ratings of foreign states, I analyze the extent to which nations that were intervention targets experienced an expansion, a retraction, or a continuance of democratic practices. Third, I compare these nations to nations that did not experience military intervention to determine which group was more likely to enjoy democratic growth. Fourth, I develop a model to predict when military interventions are most likely to promote democracy. Lastly, I assess this study and offer suggestions for future research.
Promoting Democracy
To understand why the United States might wish to promote democracy through force of arms, it is necessary to examine the emerging findings on the relationship between democratic regimes and conflict. We know that democratic regimes rarely make war on each other (Chan, 1984; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Russett, 1990; Weede, 1984 ; although see Layne, 1994 for an opposing view). Whether because of structural constraints that make going to war politically complicated, or because of the use of democratic norms in democracies' relations with other nations (Maoz & Russett, 1993) , this is one of the most important and convincing findings in international relations (Levy, 1989) . There is, however, still considerable controversy over whether democracies are less conflict-prone in general (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Chan, 1984; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1995c; Lake, 1992; Rummel, 1983; Small & Singer, 1976; Vincent, 1987) . Some argue that democratic regimes may appear equally as warprone as autocratic states because they are more likely to be victims (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1995c; Lake, 1992) . Others argue that democratic and autocratic regimes possess similar sorts of rationales for waging war on one another (Vincent, 1987 ).
Yet, if, as most scholars agree, the prospects for universal peace increase with the number of democratic regimes (although see Gleditsch & Hegre, 1995 (Lake, 1992) , a foreign policy of converting autocratic to democratic regimes may well be an efficient method by which to make the world more peaceful.
Setting or propping up a democratic regime may also help to bring greater stability in one's region and make it easier to influence the targeted nation. Thus, aside from the ideological values espoused by presidents, there may be more tangible benefits to be gained from military interventions that attempt to promote democracy. The fear that some have (Forsythe, 1992; Vincent, 1987) Indeed, most research on the causes and correlates of democracy indicates that the path to democracy is long and complex (Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 1968 Huntington, , 1984 Lijphart, 1984; Lipset, 1960; Poe & Tate, 1994 We know, however, that when presidents have spoken out so eloquently on behalf of democracy, they have often used its advancement as a pretext, a rationalization, or as rhetoric to explain (or excuse) interventions in other countries. We, as scholars, may never be able to know truly presidential motivations and goals, or whether the United States was directly responsible for governmental changes in other nations. Therefore, I do not assume that the promotion of democracy has been a goal of all US interventions. Rather, because of its prominence in US foreign policy and references to such objectives during a significant number of interventions, I simply wish to determine if the cause of democracy is helped or hindered when the US armed forces enter some nation, regardless of the intentions of presidents. The most prevalent outcome after US military intervention is no change whatsoever. In 48% of the cases where we compare the difference between the three-year averages previous and subsequent to the intervention, there was no change at all. In 74% of the cases comparing the level of democratization in the year of the intervention with the average level in the three years after, there is no change. And when we compare the difference in democratization between the year of and the year after the intervention, 63% of the countries experienced no change. Positive change occurred in 37% of the cases comparing the three-year pre and post-intervention democratic averages, in 22% of the cases comparing the democracy ratings the year of the intervention with the three years after, and 26% of the cases comparing the year of and the year after the intervention. Finally, there are also a handful of cases in each category where democracy lost ground. When one combines these cases with the number of cases where there was no The results generally follow the same patterns described above. In examining the threeyear pre and post-intervention difference, we see that 22.2% of the nations in the sample made progress toward democracy, 51.3% stayed the same, and 26.6% moved away from democracy. For the three-year post-intervention difference, 17.7% moved toward democracy, 71.5% stayed the same, and 10.8% took steps away from democratization. Finally, when we examine the difference between the year after and the year of the US military intervention, only 10.8% changed for the better, 83.5% made no movement in either direction, and 5.7% changed for the worse. We do see, however, that when comparing the progress of democracy in nations which did experience US intervention with those which did not, the former group boasts greater movement toward democracy. If one examines the difference in democracy ratings from the three years prior to an invasion with the average of the three years after, nations which experienced a military intervention are 15% more likely to make democratic gains. When one compares the difference between the democracy rating the year of an invasion with the average democracy score for the three years subsequent, the difference between intervention and non-intervention nations is only slight (4%). The difference between these two groups of nations is much more noticeable when one examines the one-year post-intervention difference (15%). There would seem to be some basis for arguing that nations which experienced a military intervention made greater progress toward democracy than those which did not.
Democracy at Gun
To test this relationship more rigorously, a probit analysis was run on all 159 cases where the United States did not use ground forces and the 27 cases where such an intervention did take place. The three different measures of democratic change were used as the dependent variables (negative change was recoded as no change), and the one independent variable was the use of ground forces by the United States. While the results are mixed, they are encouraging. Table III demonstrates that those nations which experienced a military intervention were statistically more likely to become more democratic than those nations which did not when comparing democratic ratings in the three years prior to an international crisis/military intervention with the three subsequent years. We also see that when comparing democratic change in the year of and the year after the international crisis/military intervention, nations which had undergone a military intervention were more likely to experience democratic change. The military intervention variable is also statistically significant in this model. The relationship between democratic change and military intervention when comparing the year of and the three years after an international crisis/military intervention is quite weak.
Thus far we see that there is qualified evidence that US military intervention exercises a significant and positive effect on democratization among nations. It is much more likely the Twice the log-likelihood ratio = 4.35, p < 0.05. 
A Model of Military Intervention and Democratic Change
The model I propose is based on the implicit and explicit assumptions of the democracy and conflict literature regarding the goals of democratic regimes, their relationships with adversaries and the outcomes of their interventions. First, this research has demonstrated that democratic nations have strong incentives for waging war on behalf of democracy. Therefore, it is important to know whether the promotion of democracy was an explicit goal of the United States. Second, although not directly addressed in the literature, it is important to consider the relationship between the United States, the regime it has targeted, and the population of the tar-geted nation. The support or opposition of these actors is likely to bear heavily on the success of the intervention. Lastly, the success or failure of the military intervention will play an important role in the promotion of democracy. If democratic regimes do tend to win the conflicts in which they are involved, we would expect a high rate of success for these interventions and for the promotion of democracy. I discuss below how these factors are to be measured. 
Democracy as a Goal

Analysis
Because of the scarcity of cases, I use a dichotomous probit rather than an ordered probit model to predict whether democratic growth takes place (coded as '1') or does not occur (coded as '0').9 All three measures of democratic change are employed. Both the models using the three-year, postintervention difference and the one-year postintervention difference predict 85% of the cases correctly, while the model employing the threeyear, pre and post-intervention difference is successful 81% of the time. A better measure of the predictive accuracy of the models is the proportionate reduction in error which compares the predictive success of the models with the percentage of cases one would have predicted correctly using the model category.'0 The threeyear pre and post-intervention difference model performs best with a PRE of 49%, the one-year post-intervention difference model has a PRE of 42% and the three-year post-intervention difference model has a PRE of 35%." While each of the models performs reasonably well overall, only one of the independent variables is statistically significant in a majority of the models -whether or not the US president declared democracy was a goal of the intervention.'2 When the United States is purportedly acting on behalf of democratic values, interventions are much more likely to aid the cause of democracy in the three-year and one-year postintervention models. In the three-year pre and post-intervention difference we also see that the variable measuring US opposition to a regime is statistically significant.
It would appear that military missions that were deemed successful by Brecher and Wilkenfeld's criteria were no more likely than other military operations to promote democracy. Part of this may be caused by the high level of success all these operations enjoyed. In 19 out of the 27 cases, the United States was judged as being a victor, which is similar to Lake's finding that democracies win approximately 80% of the wars in which they are involved. Thus, unfortunately there is little variation in this variable to explain democratic progress. Anti-US sentiment as measured by nongovernmental violence directed at US citizens prior to the intervention also does not appear to be a crucial factor. Since this was a rather crude measure, the hypothesis behind the variable may prove supportable if a better indicator can be found. Thus, overall we must conclude that given the limited number of cases of direct military intervention and the limited amount of information available regarding US military operations, successful prediction of democratic change is challenging at best. I assess the cumulative impact of these and earlier findings and offer suggestions for further research below.
Conclusion
I find that in the majority of cases, regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, the majority of US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy. Most nations retain their current level of democracy There are, however, important, qualified exceptions to this statement. First, when we compare nations which have experienced intervention with those that have not, we see that the former group is more likely to experience democratic growth. Probit analyses of the effects of military intervention on democratization generally supported the notion that by some measurements the use of US ground forces does lead to increased democratization. Second, we also see that when the United States appears to be truly committed to promoting democracy, as evidenced by presidential statements, it is generally quite successful. Whether presidents resort to arms to impose democracy, because they believe international peace will be served or because it is in parochial US interests to create a more pliable regime, remains to be seen. Ultimately, military intervention appears to promote democracy in a sufficient number of cases to not only warrant its future employment but also continued academic inquiry.
Based on these findings, several suggestions are offered. First, since promoting democracy is increasingly being cited by presidents as a foreign policy goal, we should expand the analysis to other US foreign policy tools to determine which is most effective at promoting democratic change. Second, we should focus attention on intensive analysis of those cases where the evidence indicates presidents stand a greater chance of promoting democracy. What other factors unique to these nations or to the nature of the US intervention make democracy more exportable? Third, we need to expand the data set forward in time to include such recent events as the intervention in Haiti. While it is doubtful we will find conclusive evidence that democracy can always be imposed through the use of force, we should at least understand if and when interventions can be successfiul.
That this research did not consistently reveal a strong connection between US military intervention and the promotion of democracy is hardly surprising given the skepticism most scholars have in the use of external pressure to influence the growth of democratic institutions. Yet, US presidents and other international leaders have consistently and increasingly spoken of the need to encourage democracy. Therefore, it still is extremely important that we investigate this phenomenon, because while we may not discover striking evidence of a relationship, the findings of this study are important for practical reasons. That is, these findings ought to serve as a caution (and perhaps as a guide) to policy-makers who are charged with encouraging democratic reforms abroad. 11. The analysis was also run using the absolute values of all three dependent variables. The results were similar, with few of the variables ever attaining statistical significance. The overall performance of the model, however, was quite weak. 12. To check the reliability of this model, variables used in similar models, such as per capita GDP, region, changes in US public support for military interventions, and the number of other nations involved in the intervention were also tested. They all failed to achieve statistical significance across most of the equations.
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